Abstract de Bodt
Introduction
The classical efficient market framework in which finance has developed its grounds does not leave a lot of place to the credit rationing phenomenon. Value creating investment should always found financing at the correct opportunity financing rate. This classical set of hypotheses does however not fit well with the reality, at least in the field of small business firms (SBF) financing. SBF do not have a direct access to financial markets and rely for a significant part of their financing on financial intermediaries, essentially the banks in the European context. Belgium is no exception to this general situation. While there are around 300 quoted firm on the Belgium stock exchange, more than 200.000 firms publish annual accounts at the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). For the most significant part of them, we are speaking of very small firms for which there are little chance to escape to bank financing.
The Belgium banking sector has undergone major transformations during the last five "Concerning the banks, their concentration and internationalisation makes more difficult for SBF to get access to the credit" (Option Finance, December 2001). The risk of such an evolution is not however a discovery for the scientific community. Numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical, have been published during the last years.
The question of the relation between credit rationing and customer relationship is at the basis of the contribution of Petersen and Rajan (1994) . The authors are, at our knowledge, the first to put into light, on the US market, the impact of the customer relationship on the credit availability. They show that, while the financing rate seems to be relatively insensible to the intensiveness of the customer, the customer relationship influences directly the level of credit rationing at which the firm is exposed. Cole (1998) shows that extensive relation between the bank and the firm leads to a higher level of credit availability. The author also analyses the role of the number of banks and concludes to the existence of a negative relation between this one and the credit availability: working with more banks leads to be faced to a higher level of credit rationing. Numerous empirical studies have confirmed this impact of the customer relationship on the credit availability. Harhöff and Körting (1998) , in the German context, confirm the results of Cole concerning the role of the number of banks. Still in the German context, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) note that the main bank plays the role of liquidity provider in situation of financial crisis. In Italia, D'Auria, Foglia and Marullo Reedtz (1999) reject the hypothesis of the hold-up problem but find that the increase of the number of banks leads to a slight decrease of the cost of the credit. Petersen and Rajan (1995) continue their work by studying the relation between the profits of the customer relationship and the level of competition in the banking sector. Their empirical study shows that the credit availability is increasing with the market power of the bank, is also increasing with the duration of customer relationship but is diminishing with the number of banks. Strahan et Weston (1998) globally seem to confirm this positive impact of the concentration of the banking sector on the credit availability. Berger et al. (1998) directly address the question of the impact of bank mergers and acquisitions on small business lending. They show that, if it is true that bank mergers seem to reduce small business lending, this effect is mostly offset by the reactions of other banks. Sapienza (2002) , on the same topic, concludes that "When banks become larger, they reduce the supply of loans to small borrowers". Bonaccorsi and Gobbi (2001) study both the impact of bank mergers and bank entries on the supply of credit to SBF. They conclude, for mergers, to a temporary reduction in outstanding credit to all sizes of borrowers and, for entries, to a relatively persistent negative impact on credit supply to small and mediumsized firms.
In this paper, we will complete the picture of existing empirical studies by investigating, in this context of high transformation of the banking sector, the factors that influence SBFs' credit rationing. Our findings lead us to formulate direct recommendations on how SBFs should manage their relations with banks (essentially, on how they should compose their pool of banks and on what kind of main bank they should choose).
We confirm several known results and gives new insights on several significant points.
Our data set is coming from a mailing inquiry to a sample of around 5.000 Belgian SBF for which we have get around 300 exploitable answers (with identification of the main bank), completed with data coming from their annual accounts. This rather small sample of observations (at least as compared, for example to the one used by Berger et al. (2001) -the authors used data coming from the Argentina's Central de Deudores on some 61,295 firms ! -or to the one used by Sapienza (2000) , who follows 9.068 firms), provides us a direct measure of rationing (at least as perceived by the SBFs), which is a key point for our study. We are indeed convinced that, without it, it is very hard to figure out what are the factors that influence its probability at the firm level. We confirm the existence of credit rationing on the Belgium market and the positive relation between credit availability and customer relationship (in particular, the duration of the relationship seems to play a central role). We also put into light the important role of some control variables such as the fact that firm is a subsidiary or not, the personal ownership of the managers and the guaranties conceded to the bank, which have not been taken (for the first two elements) into account up to now at our knowledge. We show that banks seem to be reluctant to go too far in the financing of a specific firm and that, beyond to this level, they begin to limit the access to credit (phenomenon already pointed out by Farinha and Santos (1999) and Boot (2000) ). We go further in the analysis of the role played by the number of banks. We show that, if on average, the increase of the number of banks has a negative effect on the credit availability, this effect does in fact depend on the size of the main bank, showing the role of the large-bank barrier hypothesis as stated by Berger and al. (2001) , this time in the context of the relation between the number of banks and the level of credit rationing. This result has both practical and theoretical consequences. For SBF, the good strategy to follow concerning the choice of a number of banks in order to avoid credit rationing depends heavily on the kind of the main bank they are working with. We show in particular that when the firm's main bank is one of the three biggest Belgian banks, the increase of the number of banks allows limiting the risk of credit rationing, confirming by the way the empirical results of Ongena et Smith (1999) on the Norwegian market. From the theoretical point of view, this result, completed by taking into account the level of adverse selection that the firm faces, allows us to confirm both the contributions of Thakor (1996) and Detragiache et al. (2000) 1 .
This paper is organized as follow: in the second section, we will make the point of the on our theoretical background and our research hypothesis. We then present our data set and methodology in the third section. The fourth section is dedicated to the presentation of the results and their discussion. Section 5 concludes and evocates ways for future research.
Credit Rationing and the Number of Banks

Theoretical contributions
Single-bank firm-opacity versus multiple-bank bank-distress hypotheses
Our main contribution in this paper focuses on the relation between credit rationing and the number of banks. It is therefore essential to make the point on the main contributions in this field. The analysis of the debt concentration in the financial literature has largely focused on the comparison between the two extreme situations, which are the case where it is perfectly diversified (like financing by bond emission) and the case where it is totally concentrated (the firm has only one bank). There are only a few papers that explicitly deal with the choice of the number of banks and its impact on credit rationing, at least from the theoretical point of view.
One of the first papers that tackles this issue is the one of Thakor (1996) . The author analyses the relation between risky borrowers and the number of banks in a framework characterized by adverse selection. Each borrower can simultaneously contact several banks and each bank knows the number of banks that have been contacted by the borrower. On this basis, the bank will decide if it will proceed to the financial evaluation of the borrower. This task is costly and can only imperfectly be done. Depending on its results, the bank will (or not) give the requested credit. The financial screening task being costly, the bank must outweigh this cost with a sufficiently high probability to be the only bank to accept the credit request (and therefore to be in monopoly situation). In the author model, indeed, if there is more than one bank that accepts the credit request, the competitive pressure is such that each bank will lose money, the financial screening cost being a sunk cost. In this framework, the increase of the number of banks for a given borrower will have two effects. On the one side, it will increase the probability that at least one bank will, after its financial screening, accept the credit request. Good quality borrower will be particularly sensible to this effect. On the other side, the probability for the bank to be the only one accepting the credit request will lower. The probability for a given bank to loose money on the operation (remind that the financial screening cost is a sunk cost) will therefore increase, reducing the probability that the bank, ex-ante, decides to engage the financial screening cost. This one being necessary in order to get the credit, the probability of credit rationing increases. In short, the increase of the number of banks will therefore increase the ex-ante probability of credit rationing. This should be related the to Single-bank firm-opacity hypothesis, as stated in Berger et al. (2001) . As stated by the authors, the "benefits from a bank-borrower relationship stem mainly from having a single bank with proprietary information about the borrower, which may make more credit available at lower cost to creditworthy, but informationally opaque, borrowers. Detragiache et al. (2000) propose a model which is at the basis of the choice, for a given firm, of the optimal number of banks. The optimum results from taking into account simultaneously the higher credit availability that the increase of the number of banks produces and the multiplication of transactions costs that it generates. The model analyses the case of firms engaged in investment projects. These will generate risky long term cash flows but need, to be completed, intermediate additional financing. The firms must choose the number of banks at which they will initially borrow. This choice will depend directly on the risk that the bank becomes illiquid at the intermediate period. This risk is in this model structural and exogenous to the firms. It is a feature unique to each bank. It the firm chooses to work only with one bank and if this one becomes illiquid at the intermediate period, there will be no other choice for the firm to seek other bank at this point of time. But this is not an easy task. Indeed, the firm will face a adverse selection situation which is difficult to solve. The banks that will be contacted at the intermediate period will have a much poorer set of information concerning the firm as compared to the one that the initially chosen bank has at its disposal. They will therefore suspect that the firm represents a bad risk, leading them to limit (or refuse) the credit request of the firm. This one will therefore, by choosing initially one bank, be put in a situation where the probability to not find the necessary intermediate financing increases.
If this adverse selection problem is sufficiently important (which depends on the feature of the firm or of the investment), it will conduct the firm to work initially with more than one bank in order to limit the probability of being faced to illiquid banks at the intermediate period. If, on the contrary, the adverse selection phenomenon is of low intensity, the firm will be confident to find, if necessary, one another bank at the intermediate period. It will therefore choose to work initially with only one bank in order to minimize the transactions cots. This analysis shows that the choice of the number of banks will depends on the risk of illiquidity of the financial sectors (in the framework of Detragiache et al. (2000) model, it has to be interpreted as sign of fragility of the financial sector) and on the intensity of the adverse selection phenomenon, which itself depends on the set of features of the firms (it is, for example, natural to expect a higher level of adverse selection in sectors such as new technology, heavily relying on the research and development projects). This analysis establishes a positive relation between the number of banks and the credit availability but at the cost of higher transaction costs. The authors conduct an empirical validation of their model on an Italian data set that seems to confirm this link between the fragility of the financial sector and the level of concentration of the source of financing. In Berger et al. (2001) , the Detragiache et al. (2000) contribution is the foundation of the Multiple-bank bank-distress hypothesis.
At first sight, the Thakor (1996) and Detragiache et al. (2000) approaches could appear to be conflicting in their conclusions. It is in fact not so clear-cut. We can imagine that while it is true that, on average, the increase of the number of banks increase the probability of rationing (single-bank firm-opacity hypothesis), it is at same time true that for some kind of banks (mainly those for which it exists a high risk of illiquidity), the increase of the number of sources of financing release the probability of credit rationing (multiple-bank bank-distress hypothesis). This is one of the main points that we will investigate empirically in our analysis.
The bank-type hypothesis
The single-bank firm-opacity and multiple-bank bank-distress hypotheses must be completed by the large-bank barriers, foreign-owned-bank barriers and distressed-bank barriers hypotheses, which are at the heart of the works of Berger et al. (2001) . Shortly stated, under these last hypotheses, large banks (because of orientation towards transactions lending, problem of information processing,…), foreign banks (because of cultural differences, distances, …) and distressed-banks (because of the difficulty to assess SBFs credit risks, …) all restrict credit to SBFs. We will qualify in the following this second set of hypotheses as the bank-kind hypothesis. As we will show it, the two sets of hypotheses seem in fact to be in interaction.
Empirical contributions
Two more empirical papers have focused on the determinants of the number of banks.
Convinced of the advantages of the customer relationship, Farinha and Santos (1999) study the reasons that can lead a firm, starting with a relation with a unique bank, to substitute to it a pool of banks. The authors show that the probability of enlarging the number of banks increases with the length of the period of time during which the firm has been working with one unique bank, with the size of the firm, its development and investments. Variables linked to the credit offer by bank are not significant, result which leads the authors to reject multiple-bank bank-distress hypothesis. The hold-up hypothesis is also rejected by the authors (the most profitable firms of the sample, for which the highest probability of hold-up by banks exists, are the one that have the lower probability to multiply the number of banks they are working with. The future growth and investment seem to be the main factors that push firms to enlarge their bank's pool.
One explanation that is given by the authors is the fact that banks could be reticent to be too much engaged in one firm, limiting the credit that they are willing to give outside a definite level (this point is also underlined in Boot (2000) . Let us also reference the work of Ongena and Smith (1999) . Using data collected on a large sample of 1129 firms by a mailing inquiry, the authors put into light the high variability of behaviours among European countries. While the typical number of banks is high in the South of Europe (15 in Italy, 11 in Portugal), debt financing is a lot more concentrated in the North (2 banks in Norway and Sweden, for example). One on the main factors that seems to explain these sharp differences is the nature of the legal framework in place in each country. Ongena and Smith also show, for Norwegian firms, that the number of banks increase with the size of the firm, its level of debt and the fact that this firm has a direct relation with one of the two main banks of Norway. We will have to remind this finding latter at the light of our results.
Our analysis builds on those theoretical and empirical contributions, analysing the possible coexistence of the single-bank firm-opacity and multiple-bank bank-distress hypotheses at the light of the bank-kind hypothesis. This will allow us to formulate clear recommendations on the formation of banks' pool for SBFs in order to avoid as much as possible credit rationing.
Our Data and Methodology
There is no hope to investigate seriously the relations between customer relationship, credit rationing and the number of banks if we limit ourselves to information coming from the annual financial statements. Indicators of credit rationing build on this basis are at best loose and noisy. The number of banks is not stated. and, maybe above all, the identity of the bank with which the firm is working is private information. We have therefore decided to undertake a mailing inquiry directed towards SBF. We present it in the next section. We have completed the gathered information by those available in the published annual accounts 2 and, on this basis, built a set of indicators that we present at section 3.2. We finally motivate the rational of our methodology (which remains very classic) in section 3.3.
The data
Sample selection
There are more than 200.000 firms that release annual financial statements at the NBB each year (precisely 273.709 are referenced on the April 2001 CDC-Rom). Among these, 180.496 have less than 375.000 € of total assets (code 20/58 of the Belgian annual accounts) at the end of the year 99. These are very small firms. Among them, a great number are created for a variety of (fiscal) reasons and, for those one, the choice of the number of banks is not a pertinent question to them. The financial statements that they produce are known to be quite noisy 3 . We have therefore excluded them of our analysis.
In order to focus on SBF, we also decided to exclude firms having more than 12.500.000 € total assets (5.395 firms at the end of year 99). The questionnaire has been sent in French, we have limited our sample to firms established in the French part of the Country (around 30% of the total number of firms). We have also excluded firms from the sectors NACE 8 (financial institutions, insurances, …) and NACE 9 (others services), which sum up to 23.879 firms at the end of 1999. We also have decided to take into account firms for which we have the annual accounts for both year 1998 and 1999 in order to have a reasonable probability that they are still in activity at the moment when we have sent the questionnaire (mid of the year 2000). The crossing of all these criteria leads us still to a large number of firms, precisely 9790. In order to limit the cost of sending the questionnaire, we have finally decided to draw at random one firm out of two from this sample. The questionnaire has therefore been sent to 4932 Belgian (supposed) French speaking firms.
Questionnaire description
The final version of the sent questionnaire is presented at the annex one. It has been elaborated in collaboration with SBFs and tested on a sub-sample of 500 firms. Questions are straightforward and, at least we hope so, clear. It has been built in order to be We think that the richness of the data set that this questionnaire is able to produce is really interesting. Indeed, there has been few, if any, empirical works on SBFs credit rationing taking into account, for example, the level of personal guaranties, the subsidiary status of the firm, the personal implication of managers in the ownership of the firm, …, For the former one, it is however a classic way used by banks to protect themselves against the bankruptcy risk 5 . Not taking into account the fact that the SBFs is part of a group can also leads to serious biases in inference about the behavior of banks towards SBFs. It must indeed be frequently the case that, in such a situation, the financing is negotiated bearing in mind the financial situation of the mother (or the all group). The importance of taking into account the fact that the manager is also the main shareholder is also of first importance for well known reasons of risk concentration. Last but not least, indirect measures of credit rationing are at best very noisy 6 and to get a direct indication of its presence through the SBFs manager opinion is a real improvement.
Sample of responses
Out of our 4932 sending, we have got 473 answers (9.5%), among which 296 are exploitable (6%) for this study. These answers have no missing values for the fields of information that we will use and present no serious incoherence 7 . Figure In Belgium, the requirement of personal guaranties by banks is so frequent for SBFs that it can be seen as a way to avoid the principle of limited liability of the shareholder for juridical status such as Limited company (LTD) or Private company with limited liability (PLC), … 6 The construction of indirect rationing indicators is not an easy task. The classical way used in the literature consists in evaluating the rationing by measuring how much firms have recourse to more expensive substitution credit. A firm shall have recourse to this type of financing only if it has no more access to classical lending. To tackle this problem, Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest looking at the credit offered by suppliers when it is more expensive than credit offered by banks. Harhöff and Körting (1998) use the same methodology. It seems that this choice can be disputed if one looks at the results of Biais and Gollier (1997) . Indeed, they consider that the suppliers have access to privileged information concerning the firm. Hence, the fact that they lend money to the firm is a signal used by the bank in its decision to give credit. 7 A typical case of incoherence is the case where the firm declares not to be subject to credit rationing but to have cancelled investment projects due to a shortage of financing.
measure of credit rationing, it is impossible to analyze the factors that influence its probability at the firm level.
The indicators
The analysis of the relation between credit rationing, customer relationship and the number of banks will rely on the use of a set of indicators built upon our data sources.
We present them in this section.
Rationing
Credit rationing is directly evaluated by the answers obtained to our questionnaire.
RAT_BOOL is the coding of the response to question 4.1 as a dummy variable 8 .
Size
The size (SIZE) is measured as log of the total of assets (account 2058 of the Belgian coding scheme). Its distribution is shown at Figure 1 . It is characterized by its asymmetry and fat tails (especially the right one), as compared to the classical Gaussian assumption 9 .
As in numerous previous studies (among which Berger et al. (2001), we will use the size as a proxy to firm opacity.
Juridical status
There is three kinds of juridical status (JUR) among our 296 surveyed SBFs : 176 are limited company (coded modality 1), 41 are limited co-operative partnership (coded modality 2), 79 are private company with limited liability (coded modality 3).
Score
To evaluate the financial health of firm, we have decided to use a classical scoring model (SCORE). Two reasons lead us to this choice. The first one is the widespread use of this approach by Belgium banks for SBFs credit decisions. We think that using the same data input as bankers will more easily allow us to understand their behaviors. The second 8 In attempt to improve this measure, we have tried to exploit a combination of responses to questions 4.1, 1.5 and 1.6 to evaluate the intensity of credit rationing. This lead us to a sub-sample of 13 cases of serious credit rationing, too small to be exploited for robust estimation multinomial models. 9 The value of the Jarque-Bera is 42.7, rejecting the hypothesis of Gaussian distribution at a very high probability..
reason is the high correlation between SCORE and other financial ratios that we would have used. Table 1 presents the definition of the SCORE that we have used 10 . Table 2 presents the mean SCORE by sector (first digit of NACE codification) and its correlations with the firm's financial leverage (LEV), return on investmen (ROI) and earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 11 . The three correlations are statistically significant 12 , which is not a surprise when looking at the definition of the SCORE and which confirms that the SCORE plays the role of aggregate indicator of financial health.
We can however not reject the hypothesis of no difference in the mean level of SCORE between sectors 13 , which is a little bit more surprising at first sight if we take into account high variations of debt level between sectors. This result is probably due to the very aggregated level of this analysis but the rather limited sample of firms at our disposal does not allow us to go further in the NACE codification. 
Shareholding concentration
The variable Shareholding concentration (SHARE_CONC) is the result of the coding of answers to question 4.3 in modalities (1 being the less concentrated and 4 being the most concentrated). Our sample is characterized by a high level of concentration of shareholding. In 55% of the cases, the main shareholder concentrates more than 75% of the shares (modality 4) 14 .
Shareholding and management
Answers to question 4.4 (SHARE_MAN) allow us to identify cases where the managing director is also the main shareholder and are coded as a dummy variable. It is the case in 10 The model is presented in Ooghe and Van Wymeersch (1996) . We have had to adjust its calculation to the case of firms publishing only a limited subset of the full annual account scheme, following the advices of Charles Van Wymeersch.. 11 We do not produce the exact definitions of these ratios here because they will not be anymore used. 12 We use the non parametric Spearman correlation test. 13 We use the non parametric Kruskal-Wallis test of difference of means between independent samples. 14 In 24.3% of the cases, he concentrates between 50% and 75% of the shares (modality 3). In 17.9% of the cases, he concentrates between 25% and 50% of the shares and in the 2.7% of the cases, he detains less than 25% of the shares.
85.1% of the answers (252 out of 296), emphasizing the importance of the link (not to say the fusion) between management and property for SBSs.
Subsidiary
The question 4.5 identifies SBFs which are subsidiaries (SUB). 35 firms declare to be subsidiaries of another firm (11.8%). Interestingly, in 20 out of these 35 cases, the managing director is not declared to be the main shareholder of the firm 15 . In the multivariate analyses that we will realize, we will therefore have to be careful to the overlap between SUB and SHARE_MAN. 
Number of banks
Duration of the banking relationship and age
The duration of the relationship (BANK_DUR) with the main bank is obtained through responses to question 1.4 as a ordinal variable. In our sample, 3% of the SBFs are in relation with their main bank since less 2 years, 12% between 2 and 5 years, 20% between 5 and 10 years and in more than 65% of the cases, the relationship with the main bank is more than 10 years old. At evidence, SBFs do not change of main bank easily.
The SBF's age is obtained by responses to question 4.9. There is clearly a link between the two variables, as shown at figure 5.
Importance of the main bank
The share of the main bank in the debt financing (BANK_PROP) is obtained by responses to question 1.3. In 15% of cases, the main bank contributes to less than 25% of the total debt financing, in 11% of the cases, from 25% to 50%, in 16% of the cases, from 50% to 75% and in the remaining 58%, for more than 75%. Not only is the duration of the relationship with the main bank very long, it takes also a very important place in the financing of SBSs.
Bank identification
One of the main motivations for sending our questionnaire was to get the identification of the main bank in order to be able to test for the existence of specific strategies of banks in the field of credit rationing (see the discussion of the so-called Thakor and Detragiache effects at section 2). Table 3 other banks are more difficult to classify and therefore identified as such (7 for ARTESIA, 4 for CA, 5 for CBC, 4 for DEXIA), but concern a rather limited subset of firms.
Level of guaranties
The level of guaranties (GAR), either on the form of firm's collaterals or personal guaranties, is the result of question 2.1. GAR is an ordinal variable, ranging for 1 to 4. In 31% of the cases, the SBFs give either no guaranty at all or the level of guaranties 16 It must be emphasized that there was some ambiguity in responses between FORTIS and SGB/CGER, the former one being the result of the merger of the latter. This point is important because of the very different historical place of SGB (the historical main private French bank in Belgium) and CGER (a state owned institution before its privatization). Being not able to distinguish if the FORTIS response does mean SGB or CGER (the merger between the parties at the level of bank agencies being not yet consumed at the time of the inquiry), we have decided to keep these responses separated.
amount to less than 25% of the value of debts, in 15% of the cases, guaranties amount between 25% and 50% of the debts, in 41% of cases, between 50% and 100% and in 14% of cases, for more than 100% ! The well-known important role played by guaranties for SBFs financing is verified. We have also to question the status of this variable. The level of guaranties is indeed one of the decision variables on which the banker can act. Can we consider it as an exogenous variable when analyzing credit rationing? The question is of importance for any multivariate analysis because, if not, our estimators will be biased and the only solution is to go toward simultaneous system of equations, but which raises the difficult problem to solve of identification. In our case, we think that we can consider the level of guaranties as exogenous because of its high level of persistence in time (banks do not easily accept to cancel guaranties) as compared to credit rationing (the level of which being easily changed by the decision of a new financing). We still will test the status of GAR in section 4.
Existence of appropriation account
One classical way, in SBFs, for shareholders to finance the activities of their firms is through the use of appropriation accounts (APAC). They can not be identified in the published annual accounts. Question 4.7 gives us an indication on their presence. In 97 cases (33%), there are indeed significant accounts of this type. It could be an important control variable in our analysis, due to their very specific nature (being almost a kind of equity).
Debt coverage
We include in our set of indicators the classical debt coverage ratio (COV), measured as the cash-flow from operating activities divided by the estimated interest expenses on the basis of the annual accounts 17 . The COV variable is clearly not Gaussian (Jarque-Bera statistics of 25,440 !), with high extreme values, as shown at Figure 6 . We have decided 17 As we will show it here below, this estimation is easy to realize. Pure interest expenses are not identified as such in Belgian annual account and we therefore only get a crude estimation of it using the following formula -<65>-|9126|-<656>, where <xxx> stands for using the value with its sign, |xxx| stands for absolute value, the 65 account is the charges financières, the 9126 account is the subsides en interest accordés par les pouvoirs publics and the 656 account is the Provisions à caractères financiers.
to include this indicator because it is classically followed by credit decision committees of banks.
Finally, we do not have included in our set of indicators an estimation of the level of interest rate charged by the bank. There are two main motivations to this choice. The first (and most important one) is due to the nature of the decision process of banks concerning SBFs financing. Decisions are taken by credit committees (with various kinds of denominations, depending on the bank), on the basis of credit requests. After consultation of numerous members of such decision committees, we are convinced that the main decision taken at this stage it to accept or not the credit requests, taking essentially into account the nature of firm's financing needs, its financial health and prospective and the level of guaranties that the bank will obtain. The rate charged to the firm is essentially dictated by the market conditions (level of the interest rates in the economy and degree of competition among banks). Except for important operations, which do not concern SBF, there is not specific risk premium defined in function of the quality of the specific SBF.
At most, a small rebate is done, more as a commercial gift than other think. To verify this claim, for the sub-sample of 168 SBFs for which we do have got the response to question 3.2 (short term interest rate), we have regressed the short rate on the SBF's score. The coefficient of the Score variable is -0.005 with a student statistic of -1.46, which does not to reject the hypothesis of null relation between the Score and the short rate level at any conventional confidence levels. We do therefore not think that this variable would be relevant in our analysis. The second reason, which is more factual, is linked to the well known difficulty in measuring it. We have here at our disposal three possibilities. The first one is to realize estimation by using data coming from the annual account (we take the same estimation of interest expenses as for COV divided by the total of financial debts). We will denominate RATE_ACC. The well flaws of this approach are the fact that the interest expenses do not include only interest rate charges and that the financial debt evaluated at the end of the year is by no way a good estimation of the average level of financial debts during the year. The two other approaches are to use the responses to question 3.1 (RATE_31) and 3.2 (RATE_32) of our questionnaire. that what we can measure is the result of financing decisions taken in various time periods, probably spread on more than 10 years. There is no sense in comparing them without taking into account at least the level of interest rates in the economy at the moment when the credit was granted but this would require the knowledge of all financing contracts of our sample of SBFs…
The methodology
General approach
Our focus is to analyze the relations between the level of credit rationing, the customer relationship with the main bank and the number of banks with which the firm is working.
In a first step, we will therefore present univariate statistics for our set of indicators and compare the results obtained for the sub-sample of rationed SBFs to the sub-sample of no rationed SBFs..
We will then try to model the probability of being rationed using a logistic regression model in order to evaluate the effect of the kind of main bank chosen by the firm and of the number of banks in relation with the firm on this probability. We will in this process use dummy variables to split our sample in sub-samples and also use product of these dummy variables with other indicators in order to analyze the impact of those indicators for the firms belonging to the considered sub-samples.
Statistical tests
Univariate and bivariate analyses have been realized using classical robust statistical tests such as Mann-Whitney, Kruskal-Wallis, Spreaman correlation and Chi 2 . These wellknown tests resist to the non Gaussian kinds of distribution that we are dealing with.
Multivariate analyses are based on the use of logistic regression approach. We use here the notations of Greene (2000) . We model the join probability of credit rationing (RAT_BOOL) of our sample using the following likelihood function under the hypothesis of independent observations:
(1)
where n is the number of observations in our sample, β is the vector of parameters, x is the vector of explanatory variables,
is the logistic function and bold characters are used to indicate that we deal with vectors. Taking the log, we obtain the classical log-likelihood function of the logistic regression:
[ ]
To obtain the estimation of the vector of parameters β , we maximize the log-likelihood function using the classical Newton algorithm 18 , which produce the classical maximum likelihood estimator. To get the standard errors (SE) of our estimates, the asymptotic covariance matrix of β is obtained using the inverse of the Hessian matrix evaluated at the β , which is equal to :
As we use a rather small sample of 296 observations with explanatory variables having, for the most part of them, very ill-behaved distributions, we have validate those asymptotic SE using a classical bootstrap scheme as explained in Efron and Tibshirani (1993) . Estimation of bootstrap p-values are obtained using the following approach (known as percentile bootstrap) :
-using the initial 296 of firms, we draw randomly with replacement, assessing a probability of 1/n to each observation, a bootstrap sample of 296 firms; -on this bootstrap sample, we produce a new estimation of the parameters vector * β ; -we repeat this procedure 1,000 times to produce 1,000 independent estimates of our parameter vectors; -we use these bootstrap estimates to build the bootstrap empirical distribution of the estimated coefficients and we finally estimate the p-value using it.
Beyond the level of statistical significance of our estimates, to evaluate the quality of our model, we use two indicators: the R 2 and the log-likelihood ratio (LR) test of zero slopes.
The R 2 gives us an analog of the classical R 2 but in the logistic regression setting (which is non-linear) and is the squared of the correlation coefficient between the estimated values for RAT_BOOL and the observed value of RAT_BOOL 19 . The LR-Test of zero slope is a classical log-likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of all coefficients of the model (except the constant term) being equal to zero and can be interpreted as an analog of the Fisher test in the classical linear regression setting.
The logistic regression model being non-linear, the vector of estimated parameters β does not give us the marginal effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable (the probability of being rationed). The marginal effects are in our case:
We choose to present the R 2 in place of the Pseudo-R 2 because this last can be seen as variant of the LR test of the zero slopes (see Judge et al., 1985, p. 785 ).
We do not present them here, being essentially interested by the signs of coefficients in β and their degree of significance.
To test the possible impact of colinearity among our regressors on the robustness of our results, we have estimated the condition number of the matrix of regressors 20 . Being relatively high (around 75 while Greene (2000, p.40) indicates that a condition number higher than 20 must attract the attention on the possible impact of the multicolinearity on the robustness of the results), we have redone our estimation with a reduced set of regressors (we suppressed regressors in order to go back to a condition number not higher than 30). Appendix 1 shows a typical example of the results that we get. Model 1 is with the full set of regressors while Model 2 is with the limited one. The stability of coefficient estimates for the significant variables is very satisfactory.
For testing the exogeneïty status of GAR, we based our approach on the propositions of Grogger (1990) . The author proposes a Hausman test of exogeneïty adapted to qualitative dependent variable models. It is based on the comparison the results obtained by an estimation by maximum likelihood and an estimation by non linear least instrumental variable estimator. We also tested the exogeneïty status of GAR by using a classical
Hausman test build upon a linear probabilistic model. As put into light in below, the use of these tests raises the difficult problem of identification. BANK_DUR and BANK_PROP are significant, respectively at the level of 1% and 5%.
The Results
Univariate and bivariate analyses
Both BANK_PROP and BANK_DUR being ordinal variables, we have also computed the Spearman rank correlations. They are respectively of -0.17 and -0.013, the former being highly significant (p-value of 0.001) and the latter being not significant. It appears therefore clearly that the longer the relationship between the firm and its main bank, the lower the level of credit rationing. It also appears to exist a relation between the existence of credit rationing and the proportion of debt financed by the main bank but its impact is not so clear-cut. The third significant result in Panel B is for the level of guarantees (GAR). Being also an ordinal variable, we have computed the Spearman rank correlation. Its value is 0.16 (p-value 0.003) : a high level of guarantee is correlated with the existence of credit rationing. While being very intuitive (SBFs which have already given a lot of guarantees are less able to concede even more guarantees and are therefore faced to a higher probability of rationing), this result underlines the necessity of an exogeneity test. The only disappointing result is the absence of significance of BANK_KIND variable. Does really the choice of a specific bank have no relation with the existence of credit rationing? In other words, is the population of banks homogeneous 21 The mean value of COV is contaminated by outliers. While the mean of COV for the 296 SBFs sample is around 3.9, the median is only 3.3. The Mann Whitney test, being based on rank, is however not affected.
in what concerns its behavior about rationing decisions? We will explore further this question in the following section.
Panel C allows comparing directly our results to some of the results referenced in Berger et al. (2001) . We see that, as in Berger and Udell (1996) ), BANK_KIND and GAR are not independent. The rank correlation is negative (-0.13 with a p-value of 0.01),
confirming that large banks tend to ask lower level of guaranties. We do not however confirm the dependence between BANK_KIND and SCORE. The dependence between BANK_KIND and RAT_BOOL is confirmed (at a 10% level of significance). Big banks and small banks do not behave the same way concerning rationing (more on this in the following section). We have also analyzed the relation between the nationality of the bank (by creating a dummy variable BANK_FOR which is equal to one if the bank is a foreign one) and the credit rationing. We do not find a significant relation between the two variables and, therefore, we are not able to confirm the foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis stated in Berger et al. (2001) . This result is maybe explained by the very small sub-sample of firms to are using a foreign bank as main bank (23 out 296) in our data set.
We finally put into evidence a significant relation between SIZE and the number of main banks (# BANKS) at very high level of confidence. Using SIZE as a proxy of firm opacity, this confirm that more opaque firms are choosing to work with more limited number of banks.
Multivariate analysis
Preliminary considerations
The first step in our analysis has been to test for the exogeneïty of GAR.
We do not report the full details of the test here, giving no specific insights on our analyzed question. Using the exogeneïty test of Gogger (1990) Our results are presented in tables 5, 6 and 7. We have to emphasize that reported pvalues are one-tail. If the distribution of our estimated coefficients where strictly symmetric (it is not the case in practice, probably due to the conjunction of the small size of our dataset and the very specific distributions of our regressors), we would have just to multiple the p-value by two to get the classical two-tails p-values. We have chosen not to do it because, in the theoretical framework which is our, signs have a meaning. Take for example the impact of the number of banks (BANK_N) on the probability of credit rationing (RAT_BOOL). We do not test whether the coefficient is significantly different from zero (a two-tails test) but whether it is significantly positive or negative, at the light of single-bank firm-opacity and multiple-bank bank-distress hypotheses.. Table 5 presents the analysis of the determinants of credit rationing probability (RAT_BOOL). We report the results on several variations of the model. The Base model will be the one that we will mostly comment and use. significant at a level 10%. A highest interest rate seems to lead to a highest probability of credit rationing. But we have to acknowledge that the exogenous status of the variable is not so clear. Is it not the reverse that is true? Interestingly, we see that the inclusion of RATE does not change significantly the signs or the p-value of the other coefficients as compared to the Base Model. There is therefore lot of arguments to no include RATE in the subsequent analysis : the status of variable, its limit level of significance, the stability of the other estimated coefficients without it, the above quoted (see section 3) difficulty to get a proper measure and, maybe above all, the limited degree of freedom of credit committee to play on this variable when according credit to SBFs.
Single-bank firm-opacity versus multiple-bank bank-distress hypothesis
-Base Model & JUR : we see that the coefficients of the dummies are not significant and that moreover, their inclusion do not change the values of the other estimated coefficients. We will also not anymore take into account this variable.
-Base Model & SHARE_CON : the coefficients seems to be high but a careful analysis of the results reveals that the SHARE_CON dummies replace, combined with the estimated constant, plays the role of the constant in the Base Model.
Reported bootstrap p-values have no significance in this context. There is obviously not sufficient dispersion in the responses to allow a significant estimation of the model. The variable has been discarded afterwards.
Interestingly, the other coefficients (except the constant and the coefficient of SHARE_MAN, which seems quite normal) keep comparable signs and p-values as compared to the Base Model.
-Base Model & SUB : the SUB variable has a significant negative impact on the probability of credit rationing (to be a subsidiary reduces the probability of credit rationing). The inclusion of the variable does not change the signs or p-values of the other estimated coefficients (except for SIZE, which is in any case not significant). Recalling the high overlap between SUB and SHARE_MAN pointed at section 3, we have decided also not anymore to include it.
Globally, and it is at our view the main result coming from the comparison of the five models presented at table 5, the results are very stable. The analysis of the Base Model put into light numerous interesting results :
-the coefficient of BANK_N is positive and significant. An increase in the number of banks leads to an increase in the probability of credit rationing. We confirm here the results of Cole (1998), Harhöff and Korting (1998) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) . It does a clear support of the single-bank firm-opacity hypothesis:
the increase of the number of banks reduces the probability for a given bank to be the only one to finance new projects and therefore leads to an ex-ante reduction of the probability to engage the necessary cost for the credit request screening.
-the coefficients of BANK_DUR are negative and highly significant for modalities 3 and 4. The duration of the relationship with the main bank reduces the probability of credit rationing and this especially true for longer duration. We see at the same time that the variable AGE is not really significant, which could be surprising at the light of previously published results. Recalling section 3, there however a clear link between AGE and BANK_DUR and this probably explains the obtained result.
-the coefficients of BANK_PROP are positive and significant (highly for modalities 2 and 3). The increase of the proportion of the total financing given the main bank increases the probability of rationing. We find here the same kind of result as Farinha and Santos (1999) and Boot (2000): main banks seem to be reluctant to go beyond a certain level of financing for a firm.
-the analysis of the set of control variables is also interesting. The SCORE is highly significant with a negative sign: well standing firms are less rationed then the others. GAR, for its highest modality, has a positive and significant sign. A possible interpretation is the fact that when the level of conceded guarantees is very high, there is no more alternative for the bank than to limit credit. Another interpretation could be the intuitive link between a high level of GAR and a bad financial situation. ACAS (the associate appropriation accounts) has a positive and highly significant impact on the probability of credit rationing. Two interpretations are possible : either when credit rationing is high, associates have no other choices than to contribute by themselves to the financing of the firm or banks do not like those kind of financing (which does not offer the same level of protection as equity) and ration firms using to much this kind of financing.
SHARE_MAN has finally a negative sign (but not significant), as we could expect on the classical arguments of the signaling theory (implication of the manager is signal of value of the projects, leading the bank to contribute to the financing of them). The results confirm the robustness of our results: the control variables (SCORE, ACAS, GAR) keep their impact. The same is true for relationship variables (BANK_DUR and BANK_PROP). The same is true for the BANK_N : the increase of the number of banks continues globally to increase the probability of credit rationing.
Bank-type hypothesis$$$
The main insights come from the comparison of the Base Model to the three alternatives:
-Bank influence: we add first to the Base Model the cross product of BANK_N with BIG and SMALL dummies. The coefficient of BIG is negative and significant. The increase of number of banks, in the case where the main bank is a BIG one, reduces the probability of credit rationing.
-Firm influence : we add next to the Base Model the cross product of BANK_N with OP dummy. The coefficient is negative and highly significant: for very small firms which are financed by a big bank (which are the most opaque ones for banks), the increase of the number of banks reduces clearly the probability of credit rationing.
-Bank & firm influences : when we simultaneously include in the model the cross product of BANK_N with BIG, SMALL and OP, we get the same results.
Recall the Detragiache and al. (2000) argumentation, which is at the basis of the multiplebank bank-distress hypothesis: when the main bank could be subject to an illiquidity risk, it is in the interest of firms to increase the number of banks in order to reduce the credit rationing risk and this is especially true for opaque firms which are highly exposed to adverse selection. At first sight, our results seem very surprising: is it not big banks that are the less exposed to the illiquidity risk? And if so, should not the coefficient of BIG be positive? We think that this apparent paradox lies in the definition of illiquidity risk. It is not the distressed-bank barriers that play a role here but a more general bank-kind barriers one, whichever are the specific source of the barriers (large bank, foreign bank or distressed bank). After all, SBFs do not care about the reasons why they do not get the requested credit. It can bee due to the illiquidity of the bank (at first sight, a rather rare phenomenon in the Belgium context), to the inflexible application of standard credit approval procedures, to more interesting alternative use of funds for the bank than SBFs' financing, to an increased distance from its customers, … (the large-bank barriers hypothesis).. We think that in fact, big banks are a lot more rigid in the application of the This result has a very direct consequence on the strategy that SBS should put into place concerning their financing: if working with a main bank which can be classified as a big one (as opposed to small regional banks), it is in the interest of SBFs to increase the number of banks that they are working with in order to lower credit rationing. This is particularly true for very small SBFs, due to the adverse selection risk that they face. If working with smaller banks, probably less rigid in their decision taking process, it is in the interest of SBFs to limit the number of banks in order to lower credit rationing. In other words, it does not seem to be general rules concerning the choice of the number of banks: it depends on the kind of main bank.
Conclusion
We analyze in this paper the relation between credit rationing, customer relationship and the number of banks for small business firms (SBFs). The question is of importance: to avoid credit rationing, must SBFs concentrate their bank financing as much as possible and play on a long customer relationship to reduce information asymmetry or, on the contrary, is it in their interest to enlarge their bank pool to lower the probability of credit request refusal ?
Current theoretical contributions do not give us a definitive answer. Thakor (1996) suggests that, if it is true that a larger number of banks will ex-post increase the probability of acceptance of specific credit request, it ex-ante leads banks to be more reluctant to invest the necessary sunk costs to analyze the credit request (single-bank firm-opacity hypothesis). Detragiache and al. (2000) , in a multi-periodic setting, take into account the illiquidity risk of the main bank to show that, if this risk exists, it is in the interest of firms to increase the number of banks they are dealing with (multiple-bank bank-distress hypothesis). They also show that this is even truer if the firm is relatively opaque, due to the adverse selection risk that it is faced to. At those arguments, we have also to add the taking into account of the kind of bank that we are talking about (large, foreign or distressed banks).
To go further in this debate, we have decided to conduct a large empirical investigation.
Somewhat five thousands questionnaires have been sent to a population of small Belgian firms. The obtained information has been completed by data coming from their annual accounts. We finally get a sample of three hundreds exploitable responses. This data set is somewhat unique because it includes the identification of the main bank.
Our main result is as follows: it depends on. There is no unique general strategy for SBFs to follow in order to choose the number of banks to deal with. It depends fundamentally on two factors: the kind of main banks there are dealing with and the degree of opacity that characterized them. Let us take the two extreme situations:
-for very small SBSs (presumed to be highly opaque for the bank) dealing with big main banks (presumed to be more rigid in their application of the credit approval procedures and therefore, more illiquid from the point of view of the firm), it is in their interest the enlarge the number of banks that they are dealing with. It will reduce the probability to be rationed.
-for bigger SBFs (presumed to present a lower level of opacity) dealing with regional or local banks, it is in their interest to concentrate bank financing as much as possible. It will lower the probability of credit rationing, probably because it will stimulate the chosen main bank to invest in its relation with the firm.
We think that is a result of importance, especially taking into account the higher number of transformations and concentrations that feature the banking sector. For SBFs, absorption of local banks by main multinational players can signify the need to change of policy concerning the choice of a number of banks in order to avoid unexpected credit request refusal.
Our empirical investigations put also into light several other interesting results. Some of them are confirmation of already published ones (there is a negative relation between credit rationing and the customer relationship, banks seem to be reluctant to go too far in the financing of one specific firm, ….) but also stressed the importance of control variables such as associate appropriation account, subsidiary status of the firm, the level of personal and firm guarantees conceded to the bank in the analysis of the determinants of credit rationing. At our opinion, too few empirical analyses take them into account, which probably leads to biased inference.
Annexe 1
Questionnaire sent to 4932 Belgian Small Business Firms mid 2000. The requested information concerns the situation of the firm at the end of year 1998. The questionnaire is not anonymous, the VAT number of firm being mentioned on it in order to allow an exploitation of the data coming from the annual financial statements. Table 1 Definition of the scoring model used to evaluate the financial health of SBFs. | xxx | is used to indicate that we take the absolute value, < xxx > is used to indicate that we take the number with its sign. The model originated from Ooghe and Van Wijmeersch (1996) , As usual, *** is for statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% . Panel A show the clear links between credit rationing and financial health (either through SCORE or COV). We also see that the mean number of banks is statistically different for rationed firms as compared to the not rationed ones. Panel B highlights the dependence between credit rationing and the duration of the bank relationship (BANK_DUR) as well as the importance of the main bank in the total financing of the firm (BANK_PROP). It also highlights the link between the level of guaranties and the credit rationing. Panel C is dedicated to a comparison to some of the results referenced in Berger et al. (2001) . 0.00*** Table 5  Table 5 presents the analysis of the determinants of credit rationing probability (RAT_BOOL). We report the results on several variations of the model. The Base model will be the one that we will mostly comment and use (see section 4.2 for its analysis). The four other models (Base Model & RATE, Base Model & JUR, Base Model & SHARE_CONC, Base Model & SUB), as their name indicates it, are obtained by the addition of respectively variable RATE, JUR, SHARE_CONC and SUB to the base model. Table 6  Table 6 analyzes the impact the number of banks (BANK_N) when the main bank is a big bank (BIG) or a small bank (SMALL) and when the level of opacity of the firm (OP) is high. BIG is equal to one when the main bank is BBL, SGB , KBC (the leading three private Belgian banks), Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank. SMALL is equal to one for the set of small Belgian banks (see table 3 for a list of them). OP is finally equal to one if the firm is in the first quartile of SIZE, considering that very small firms are a lot more opaque for banks. Results are commented at section 4.2. 
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Figure 3
The distribution of SCORE (defined at Table 1) is presented. As for SIZE, the distribution is characterized by asymmetry and fat tails. The hypothesis of Gaussian distribution is rejected by a Jarque-Bera test (291.3) of normality at a very high probability level. 
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Figure 4
The distribution of NBANK (number of banks, information obtained by answers to question 1.1) on our 296 responses is presented. The distribution is skewed with a right fat tail. The most frequent case for SBFs is to have 2 banks. Only 21% for SBFs in our sample are working with a unique bank. 
Distribution of NBANK among the 296 responses
Figure 6
The distribution of COV (the ratio of cash-flow from operating activities divided by the estimated interest expenses) on our 296 responses is presented. The distribution here is truncated because of the presence of left and right extreme values. The Jarque-Bera test rejects the hypothesis of Gaussian distribution at a very level of significance (the statistic value is 25440). 
Distribution of COV among the 296 responses
16%
Distribution 5% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 2% 12%14% 12%10% 6% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 2% 1% 1% 7% 
Figure 7
The distributions of RATE_ACC (the estimation of the interest rate charged to the firm through the information included in the annual account), of RATE_31 (the long term interest rate charged as indicated at question 3.1 of our questionnaire) and of RATE_32 (the short term interest rate charged as indicated at question 3.2 of our questionnaire). As expected, short rates (RAT_32) are, on average higher than long rates (RAT_31). Estimations (RAT_ACC) through the annual accounts is somewhere in between, with high extreme values (probably due to seasonal financing in the case of SBFs). The correlation between RAT_ACC and RAT_31 is 0.26, which is to be considered as a rather low figure if we keep in mind that they are measure of the level of interest rates charged to the firm, and 0.48 with RAT_32, which shows that short term financing conditions seems to weight heavier in total financial charges of firms. The amplitudes of the distributions are impressive, showing that SBFs experiment very different financing conditions. 4 % 5 % 6 % 7 % 8 % 9 % 1 0 % 1 1 % 1 2 % 1 3 % 1 4 % 1 5 % 1 6 % 1 7 % RATE_ACC RATE_31 RATE_32
